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ABSTRACT 
This article analyses the apparent tensions between the current Canadian law on the 
Crown's duty to consult with Indigenous peoples, which generally refuses an 
Indigenous veto over proposed land uses in traditional lands, and the principle of 
prior informed indigenous consent, as enshrined in the recent U.N. Declaration of 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The tension between these competing visions of the 
rights of Indigenous communities has given rise not just to theoretical legal conflicts, 
but also to destructive conflicts on the ground. The author argues that attention to 
the dialogic framework within which Indigenous concerns are addressed during 
consultations, and particularly to indigenous peoples’ participation in developing 
that framework, is key to managing those conflicts effectively and to reconciling 
current Canadian law and practice with the principles of the U.N. Declaration. Next 
it examines a question on which Canadian consultation law is largely silent: the 
allocation of benefits derived from developments on Indigenous traditional lands. 
Finally, the analysis turns to the principle of free, prior and informed consent to the 
substance of proposed developments on traditional lands. The article concludes that 
the objective of obtaining such consent is a salutary one that has been wrongly 
marginalized in both the jurisprudence and Canadian government practice.  
 
 
The food we get from the land, which includes fish, moose, caribou, 
geese, ducks and other fowl, provides us with much-needed nutrients and 
protein. This food from the land also serves a central role in our culture. It 
is brought to our elders for distribution amongst our people... Anything 
that may disrupt this fragile system, our sacred relationship with and 
stewardship of the land, the safety of our drinking water, or our ability to 
hunt, fish and trap is of great concern to our people, who live in 
circumstances best described as marginal.1 
I stand by the fact that the land I’m in, on now is our land. I believe God 
put us there. God have us a language, the animals to live off and we just 
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1  Chief Donny Morris, Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation, Affidavit of Chief Donald Morris, 
Motion Record of the Respondents, Platinex Inc v Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug, Court File No 06-
0271 (Ont Sup Ct), May 16, 2006.  
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don’t want to see development on that area...As a treaty partner I expect to 
be treated as a partner, not, not where one is superior than us.2 
The past 25 years have been an exciting and challenging time for all who are 
concerned about the significance of Indigenous voices in relation to resource 
developments on the traditional lands of Indigenous peoples in Canada. Over the 
previous century, those voices had been largely unheeded in decision-making 
processes about the future uses of those traditional lands. One major exception to this 
trend was the negotiation of 24 modern treaties over the past 40 years in northern 
Canada and British Columbia; treaties which provided compensation for the use of 
Aboriginal title lands and offered the new Indigenous treaty partners detailed 
processes for participating in environmental and development decisions affecting 
their traditional lands.3 In parallel to the development of modern treaties, a series of 
decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that Aboriginal groups are 
entitled to be consulted wherever provincial or federal governments propose to make 
decisions about land use that would infringe upon their constitutionally-protected 
Aboriginal rights, treaty rights, or title rights.4  
It was not until 2004 that the Supreme Court of Canada set out in detail the 
nature of the consultation process required of the provincial and federal governments 
when they propose to make a decision that may interfere with Aboriginal rights. In 
Haida Nation5, the Court ruled that the duty of federal and provincial governments to 
consult Indigenous communities extends to situations where the existence of section 
35 rights has not yet been adjudicated, so long as the communities can show a prima 
facie claim that their rights would be affected by the proposed decision. This last 
point is particularly significant given the length of time it will take to resolve 
individual section 35 claims across the country. The duty to consult derives from the 
                                                
2  Chief Donny Morris, evidence quoted by Smith J in Platinex Inc v Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug 
Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation, 2008 CanLII 11049 (Ont Sup Ct) at para 15.  
3  The first treaty of the modern era was the James Bay Northern Quebec Agreement, 1977.  This 
Agreement permitted the government of Quebec to flood an extensive area within the territories of the 
Cree, Inuit and Naskapi peoples in northern Quebec. In exchange, the Agreement provided 
compensation and explicitly delineated ongoing indigenous self-government and management rights 
within the treaty territory. See James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA), 1977, online: 
<www.gcc.ca/pdf/LEG000000006.pdf >. The Agreement has since been amended several times.  
4  In 1990, the unanimous Supreme Court of Canada judgment in R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 
[Sparrow] indicated that in seeking to justify an infringement on Aboriginal rights the “questions to be 
addressed” by the Crown include the matter of whether the Crown had consulted the Aboriginal group 
affected (at 1119), a statement affirmed by the Court six years later in the context of treaty rights in R v 
Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771 at para 97 [Badger]. In Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 
at para 168 [Delgamuukw], the Court confirmed and clarified the obligation of the Crown to consult in 
good faith and attend to the concerns of holders of Aboriginal title when it proposes regulations or 
developments that would affect their title rights (see Lamer CJC at paras 167−169 and LaForest J at 
paras 203−204). However, as late as 2004, federal and provincial governments continued to maintain 
that no such duty to consult existed in the case of an unproven Aboriginal right before such a right was 
confirmed by the courts: see Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at 
para 8 [Haida Nation]. 
5  Haida Nation, supra note 4. See also the companion case issued simultaneously by the Court: River 
Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74. 
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principle of the “honour of the Crown”, which requires the Crown, in reconciling its 
sovereignty claims with those of Aboriginal peoples, to act with integrity in all of its 
dealings with Aboriginal peoples, from treaty-making to the resolution of Aboriginal 
claims.6 In Haida Nation, the Court ruled that for federal and provincial governments 
to completely ignore Aboriginal claims while making decisions to exploit traditional 
Aboriginal lands would be to act dishonourably, or in violation of their duty.7  
In every case where its duty is triggered, Canadian law now requires the 
Crown to consult in good faith with the Aboriginal group affected and with the 
intention of substantially addressing their concerns. The extent of the required 
consultation process, and the degree to which decision-makers must accommodate 
Indigenous concerns, depends on the strength of the Aboriginal group’s claim to 
section 35 rights and the extent of the proposed interference with those rights. 
Accordingly, while the duty to engage in some consultation with Aboriginal peoples 
is triggered at a relatively low threshold, the extent of the consultation process and 
the burden on the Crown to address Aboriginal concerns will vary from case to case. 
Building on its earlier jurisprudence interpreting section 35, the Court in Haida 
Nation confirmed that provincial and federal agencies must tailor each consultation 
process in proportion to the seriousness of the potential impact of their decision on 
existing Aboriginal or treaty8 rights. While both parties to the consultation must 
always engage with each other in good faith, the extent of the consultation process 
required will vary from mere notice of the proposed decision and discussion to, in 
the most serious cases of potential infringement, a formal process for receiving 
submissions from the Aboriginal group and the provision of written reasons by the 
Crown to demonstrate that those submissions were taken into account before a final 
decision was reached.9 Although the Court affirmed that in general Aboriginal 
consent is not a prerequisite for the Crown to proceed with its final decision, the 
Supreme Court’s development and clarification of the duty to consult over the past 
25 years has given Indigenous communities a dramatic new lever to influence land 
use decisions that will affect them. 
Nonetheless, gaps remain in the guidance offered by the Court as to the 
process that the parties should follow when the duty to consult arises. In part, a 
certain degree of vagueness necessarily follows from the principle that consultation 
should be more profound when a proposal threatens to have serious impacts and the 
Indigenous rights claim is strong. 10  Accordingly, no detailed template for 
consultation will serve in every case. Second, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
made clear that negotiation processes should be developed by the parties themselves, 
                                                
6  Haida Nation, supra note 4, at paras 16 and 17. 
7  Ibid at para 27. 
8  A year after its judgment in Haida Nation, the court confirmed that the same consultation principles 
apply to decisions affecting lands covered by historical treaties: Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada 
(Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69 [Mikisew]. 
9  Haida Nation, supra note 4 at paras 40−45. 
10  Ibid at paras 43−46. 
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and that federal and provincial governments should attend to the mandates of any 
regulatory schemes that might aid them in fulfilling their procedural duties.11 
However, it has become clear in recent years that more direction is required to avoid 
continuing conflicts over the adequacy of consultation in individual cases. At 
present, the Crown and Indigenous communities are required to listen to and 
consider each other’s views in good faith. But if, in good faith, they seriously 
disagree about the strength of the community’s rights claim or about the severity of a 
project’s impacts, in a real sense the consultation process will fail. It will fail as a 
mechanism for consensus-building, it will fail as a reliable vehicle for facilitating 
decisions about resources on traditional lands, and it will fail as a process aimed at 
helping to achieve reconciliation between Indigenous peoples and the state. 
Closely related to this concern about the capacity of existing consultation 
requirements to promote consensus, there appears to be a divergence between 
domestic Canadian law and emerging international law on whether a state must 
obtain the consent of Indigenous peoples before making decisions that would affect 
their traditional lands. Most recently enshrined in the U.N. Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),12 the standard of free, prior and informed consent 
seems more stringent than the general Canadian requirement of consultation and 
possible accommodation of Indigenous concerns. Indeed, the apparent difference 
between the two standards was one of the major reasons cited by the Canadian 
government when it voted against the Declaration in 2007 and when it later qualified 
its acceptance of the document in 2010.13 Although the UNDRIP has been endorsed 
by 147 nations, it is not a binding statement of international law. Nevertheless, the 
recently-elected Prime Minister of Canada has declared that his government will 
implement its provisions.14 Further, as a statement of internationally-accepted norms, 
the UNDRIP is a document that may have persuasive value for courts applying the 
Canadian law on consulting Aboriginal peoples.15 Indeed, a number of international 
                                                
11 Ibid at para 51. 
12 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UNGAOR (2007), 
online: <www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf> [UNDRIP]. 
13 See e.g. Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, “Canada’s Statement on the World 
Conference on Indigenous Peoples Outcome Document: New York, 22 September 2014” (Canada: 
Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, 22 September 2014), online: 
<www.canadainternational.gc.ca/prmny-mponu/canada_un-canada_onu/statements-declarations/other-
autres/2014-09-22_WCIPD-PADD.aspx?lang=eng>.  
14 Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement By Prime Minister On Release Of The Final Report Of The Truth 
And Reconciliation Commission” (Ottawa: Prime Minister of Canada, 15 December 2015), online: 
<http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2015/12/15/statement-prime-minister-release-final-report-truth-and-
reconciliation-commission>. 
15 On the persuasive value of international legal principles, and of the provisions of UNDRIP in particular, 
in the context of the Canadian duty to consult, see Dwight G Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult 
Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich, 2014) at 144−153 [Newman, Revisiting]. See also Simon v 
Canada (AG), 2013 FC 1117 at para 121. Referring to the UNDRIP, the federal court ruled, “[w]hen it 
comes to interpreting Canadian law, there is a presumption, albeit refutable, that Canadian legislation is 
enacted in conformity to Canada’s international obligations…Indeed, while this instrument [the 
UNDRIP] does not create substantive rights, the Court nonetheless favours an interpretation that will 
embody its values.”  
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business organizations have already decided to adopt the standard of free, prior and 
informed consent in their dealings with Indigenous peoples.16  
These developments raise the question of whether the current Canadian law 
governing the duty to consult Indigenous communities is inconsistent with prevailing 
international norms. The growing international emphasis on the principle that the 
consent of Indigenous peoples should be obtained prior to developments on their 
traditional lands cannot but increase the focus on the ability of current Canadian 
consultation processes to promote consensus-building between the parties. In this 
context, our analysis will focus first on two aspects of Canadian consultation law that 
have received little attention to date in academic writing: the importance of 
Indigenous participation in developing the processes through which they are 
consulted about decisions that will affect their rights and interests, and the duty of 
federal and provincial governments during those consultation processes to address 
the fairness of the benefits Indigenous groups would receive from developments on 
their traditional lands. Our analysis will suggest that both Canadian law and 
governmental practice recognize that Aboriginal peoples have a right to participate in 
shaping the contours of the dialogue through which their interests and concerns will 
be addressed, that such participation is consistent with current international 
standards, and that it would strengthen the capacity of consultation processes to 
result in consensual decisions about the use of traditional lands. Second, an 
examination of the nature of treaty and Aboriginal title rights will suggest that 
Canadian consultation law and practice must address the fair allocation of benefits 
from proposed developments on lands traditionally used by Aboriginal peoples. This 
is an issue that has received relatively little attention in the leading Canadian 
consultation cases, although it also is an issue addressed in the UNDRIP. Third, we 
will return to the principle of free, prior and informed consent enshrined in the 
Declaration to re-examine the question of whether seeking to obtain the consent of 
Aboriginal peoples in relation to Aboriginal title and treaty lands is in fact 
inconsistent with Canada’s consultation law and Constitution.  
Let us begin then by reviewing the consultation provisions of the UNDRIP 
as they compare with current Canadian jurisprudence and practice, both in terms of 
the legal status accorded to Indigenous concerns about development on traditional 
lands and the conception of Indigenous-state relations that undergirds that status. 
Examining the Canadian duty to consult Indigenous peoples and the equivalent 
standards in the UNDRIP is useful for a number of reasons. A comparison of the 
Canadian jurisprudence with the international articulation of free, prior and informed 
consent allows us a fresh perspective from which to consider the precise content of 
the Canadian law. At the same time, the emerging international consultation norms 
provide a useful stimulus for representatives of the Crown and Indigenous peoples to 
develop principled consultation processes that reflect both Canada’s unique history 
and the contemporary challenge of reconciling Indigenous peoples and the Crown. 
Beyond that, as we shall see, the comparison provides a useful springboard for 
                                                
16As discussed below. See infra note 33. 
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reflection on the historical and legal pillars upon which the Canadian duty to consult 
is founded.  
I. HEEDING INDIGENOUS VOICES: THE U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS 
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE CANADIAN DUTY TO CONSULT 
The principle of free and informed consent set out in the UNDRIP is closely tied to 
the concepts of self-determination and the equality of Indigenous peoples. This is 
underlined by the express confirmation of those principles in Articles 2 and 3 and in 
the preamble to the UNDRIP.17 Its source in those principles is also reflected by the 
Declaration’s use of the term “indigenous peoples”, not only in the articles of the 
Declaration that confirm their right of free and informed prior consent, but also 
throughout the text. The term “peoples”, of course, has long been associated in 
international law with the right to self-determination.18 From the perspective of the 
UNDRIP, Indigenous peoples derive their collective right to participate in decisions 
that affect them precisely because of their status as distinct and equal peoples.  
The unique status of Indigenous peoples explains the terms of Article 27 of 
the UNDRIP. Article 27 calls for states to establish fair processes for adjudicating 
the rights of Indigenous peoples in relation to their lands and resources. 
Significantly, the article also provides that such processes be developed “in 
conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned” and that they give “due recognition 
to indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems.”19  Further, 
the equality of Indigenous peoples as holders of property rights is reflected in the 
right of Indigenous peoples, as set out in Article 28, to obtain “just, fair and equitable 
compensation” for the taking or use of lands and resources that they traditionally 
owned without their prior, free and informed consent.20 Both of these issues – the 
                                                
17 UNDRIP, supra note 12. Article 2 of the Declaration reads: “Indigenous peoples and individuals are 
free and equal to all other peoples and individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of 
discrimination, in the exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or 
identity.” Article 3 of the Declaration reads: “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. 
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.” Finally, the reference to self-determination in the preamble to the 
Declaration reads: “Acknowledging that the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
as well as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action affirm the fundamental importance of the 
right to self-determination of all peoples, by virtue of which they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” 
18 For the relevance of the principle of self-determination in shaping the free, prior and informed consent 
requirements of the UNDRIP, see Cathal Doyle, Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights and 
Resources: The Transformative Role of Free Prior and Informed Consent (Oxford: Routledge Press, 
2015) at 101−24 [Doyle, Indigenous Peoples]. See also Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, “The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: A Manual for National Human Rights Institutions” (Switzerland: Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013) at 19−30, online: 
<www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IPeoples/UNDRIPManualForNHRIs.pdf>. 
19 UNDRIP, supra note 12, Article 27. 
20 Ibid, Article 28. 
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participation of Indigenous peoples in shaping the processes which will determine 
their rights in relation to the traditional lands, and their right to compensation for the 
use of the resources on those lands – raise important questions for Canadian law 
which will be addressed later in this analysis. 
On the state’s obligation to reach consensus with Indigenous peoples 
concerning developments that would affect their lands or resources, at first glance 
the text of the UNDRIP seems clear. Indigenous consent appears to be required. 
Further, that consent must not be coerced, secured in advance of the state action, and 
provided on the basis of adequate information regarding the possible implications of 
the state action. Article 32(2) of the UNDRIP reads as follows: 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous 
peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to 
obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project 
affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in 
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, 
water or other resources.21 
Does the UNDRIP contemplate a right of veto, then, for Indigenous peoples 
in relation to developments affecting their traditional lands? The text clearly goes 
further in according significance to the consent of Indigenous peoples than did 
earlier international instruments concerning Indigenous rights. The ILO Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989, for example, provided only for states to 
consult in good faith with Indigenous peoples about administrative measures that 
might affect them. The text of Article 32 of the UNDRIP appears to require more 
than consultation, necessitating in the view of some commentators that the prior 
consent of Indigenous peoples be obtained for developments on traditional lands in 
all but the most exceptional circumstances.22 
A closer look at the text of the UNDRIP and, in particular, the evolution of 
Article 32 suggests, however, that the right of Indigenous consent enshrined in that 
article may be more nuanced. The original draft of Article 32 had provided that 
Indigenous peoples had “the right to require that States obtain their free and 
informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands, territories 
                                                
21 Ibid, Article 32. All told, the application of the principle of free prior and informed consent is identified 
in six different contexts in the Declaration, ranging from the relocation of Indigenous peoples from their 
lands (Article 10), to the application of administrative measures to indigenous peoples (Article 19) and 
the storage of hazardous materials on indigenous lands (Article 29.2) [emphasis added]. 
22 Cathal Doyle, for example, in a comprehensive review of the principle of free, prior and informed 
consent, concludes that nothing less than Indigenous consent to decisions affecting Indigenous lands is 
necessary to recognize the inherent equality of Indigenous peoples, their right to self-determination, and 
their capacity to counter power imbalances in their relations with the state. See Doyle, Indigenous 
Peoples, supra note 18 at 126−145 and 227−284. See also UNESCOR, Forum on Indigenous Issues, A 
draft guide on the relevant principles contained in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, International Labour Organisation Convention No. 169 and International Labour 
Organisation Convention No. 107 that relate to Indigenous land tenure and management arrangements, 
8th Sess, UN Doc E/C.19/2009/CRP.7, May 2009 at 19, online: 
<www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/E_C19_2009_CRP_7.doc>. 
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and other resources.”23 The final version, as noted, provides that states must consult 
with Indigenous peoples “in order to obtain” their free and informed consent. This 
language lies somewhere between the right to require consent and the right to be 
consulted with a view to obtaining consent. Accordingly, prominent commentators 
like James Anaya, the former U.N Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, Matthew Coon Come, and other Aboriginal leaders in Canada, have 
indicated that in their view Article 32 does not endorse an absolute right of veto for 
Indigenous peoples in all cases affecting Indigenous lands.24 Anaya, for example, has 
expressed the view that that the prior consent principle, although a “general 
requirement,” may be subject to “necessary and proportional” limitations under state 
law consistent with international human rights law and that it does not apply to 
intrusions on Indigenous lands that do not “substantially affect” the exercise of 
Indigenous peoples’ rights.25 
At least one international tribunal has reviewed the principle of free and 
prior informed consent and concluded that its application should be nuanced. The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, after reviewing consent and consultation 
requirements under international law (including Article 32 of the UNDRIP, which 
Suriname had endorsed), has suggested that those requirements vary depending on 
the nature of the Indigenous rights in question. In its groundbreaking 2007 decision 
in Pueblo Saramaka vs Suriname, the court confirmed that the government of 
Suriname had a duty to consult the Saramaka people in accordance with their 
customs and traditions before approving development or investment plans on their 
traditional lands.26 In that case, the government approved several mining and logging 
operations on Saramaka lands as well as the building of a hydro-electric dam that 
flooded tribal lands and forcibly displaced tribal members, apparently even without 
consulting the tribe. That governmental duty, the court ruled, rises beyond 
consultation to the level of requiring free, prior and informed consent in cases 
“regarding large-scale development or investment projects that would have a major 
impact” within the Indigenous people’s traditional territory.27  
                                                
23 Mauro Barelli, “Free, prior and informed consent in the aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples: developments and challenges ahead” (2012) 16 Intl JHR 1 at 10 [emphasis 
added]. 
24  For Matthew Coon Come’s statement, see Jenny Uechi, “First Nation groups condemn federal 
government’s ‘indefensible attack’ on Indigenous rights at UN meeting” Vancouver Observer (25 
September 2014), online: <www.vancouverobserver.com/news/first-nation-groups-condemn-federal-
governments-indefensible-attack-indigenous-rights-un>.    
25  See United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
indigenous peoples, James Anaya, UNGAOR, 24th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 (2013) at 9−12, online: 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session24/Documents/A-HRC-24-41_en.pdf>. 
26 Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname (2007), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 82, at para 134 
[Saramaka]. 
27 Ibid. In para 137 of the judgment, the Court appeared to further qualify the right of consent, limiting it 
to cases of “major development or investment plans that may have a profound impact on the property 
rights of the members of the Saramaka people to a large part of their territory.” In Saramaka, the legal 
instrument directly applied by the court was the American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty 
Series No. 36, 1144 UNTS 123, Article 21 (property rights), online: 
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In a recent case involving the exploitation of oil within the traditional 
territories of the Kichwa Indigenous people in Ecuador, the Inter-American Court 
avoided the issue of prior Indigenous consent completely. In Kichiwa Indigenous 
People of Sarayaku v Ecuador28, the Court issued a declaration that Ecuador had 
violated the rights of the Kichiwa to be consulted under Article 6 of the ILO 
Convention 169 (which Ecuador has ratified)29 and other international instruments, 
including the UNDRIP.30 The Court had little trouble finding that the activities of the 
oil company – which involved building heliports, destroying caves and sources of 
drinking water, as well as sacred sites, all with no prior consultation with the 
Kichiwa people – violated the relevant consultation requirement of the ILO 
Convention together with the obligation to consult as a “general principle of 
international law.”31 However, although its judgment elaborated on the requirements 
of adequate consultation, reiterating for example that consultations with Indigenous 
peoples must be carried out using “culturally appropriate procedures,”32 the Court 
declined to address submissions that the relevant international law required that the 
state obtain Indigenous consent to the project. 
The precise meaning and application, then, of the principle of free, prior and 
informed consent, as enshrined in section 32 of UNDRIP, remain to be defined. It is 
conceivable that future interpretations of Article 32 will limit its application to cases 
of profound intrusion on Indigenous lands or resources, and rule that the consent 
principle is subject to proportionate legislative restrictions in the public interest. 
Nonetheless, the focus of the Declaration – on the goal of securing the agreement of 
Indigenous peoples to resource developments that would affect them – has 
considerable symbolic power. It is a focus that emphasizes, after centuries of 
colonial reliance on “discovery” and “terra nullius”, the inherent equality of 
Indigenous peoples and their right to determine their own economic, political, and 
cultural destinies in partnership with the state. Further, the project of seeking prior 
and informed consent before resource developments has the pragmatic benefit of 
promoting social peace between Indigenous peoples, the state, business interests, and 
local communities. In light of this, it is noteworthy that the past decade has seen a 
growing number of commercial and non-governmental organizations that have 
adopted the standard of free prior and informed consent in relation to projects 
affecting Indigenous peoples.33 
                                                                                                               
<www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic3.American%20Convention.htm>. For other significant 
decisions of tribunals following the lead of Saramaka in applying international instruments toward the 
recognition of Indigenous land rights, see Barelli, supra note 23 at 12. 
28 Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador (2012), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 245 
[Sarayuka]. 
29 Canada is not a party to the ILO Convention. 
30 Sarayuka, supra note 28 at paras 160−66, 211. 
31 Ibid at para 164. 
32 Ibid at para 177. 
33  These include the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada, the International Finance 
Corporation, the International Council on Mining and Metals and the Boreal Leadership Council. For an 
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Unlike the text of Article 32 of the UNDRIP, Canadian jurisprudence on the 
state’s obligations to engage in dialogue with Indigenous peoples is not based on a 
foundational principle of Indigenous consent to activities on their traditional lands. 
The Canadian law on the duty to consult Aboriginal peoples, which predates the 
adoption of UNDRIP, originated in the courts’ efforts to balance the rights of 
Aboriginal peoples with the sovereignty historically asserted by the Crown over 
Aboriginal lands. Although the Canadian law on consultation also derives from the 
rights enjoyed by “Aboriginal peoples” under the Constitution Act, 1982, 34 its 
sources derive more directly from judicial descriptions of the implications of duty of 
the state to act in accordance with the “honour” of the Crown, whose sovereignty 
over Indigenous peoples and their traditional lands has not thus far been challenged 
by Canadian courts. 35  In its first decision interpreting section 35 rights, R v 
Sparrow,36 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that those rights are not absolute, and 
may be overridden by federal and provincial governments who can show, first, that 
the rights violation is justified by a compelling and substantial objective, and second, 
that the violation is a proportionate one, consistent with the “honour of the Crown.”37 
One of the factors cited by the Court as relevant to the second part of this 
justification test was whether the Aboriginal group in question had been consulted in 
connection with the measure infringing its rights.38 Although Aboriginal peoples’ 
consent was not a prerequisite for federal or provincial governments to enact 
                                                                                                               
excellent review of this trend, see Shin Imai, “Consult, Consent and Veto: International Norms and 
Canadian Treaties” in Michael Coyle & John Borrows, eds, The Right(s) Relationship: Reimagining the 
Implementation of Historical Treaties (forthcoming, University of Toronto Press) [Imai, “Consult”]. 
There is a decades-long history of companies choosing to negotiate impact-benefit agreements with 
Indigenous peoples, both in Canada and abroad. For an interesting review of four recent examples of 
companies committing to free prior and informed consent in their dealings with Indigenous peoples, see 
Cathal Doyle & Jill Carino, Making Free Prior & Informed Consent a Reality: Indigenous Peoples and 
the Extractive Sector (2013), online: <www.piplinks.org/makingfpicareality>. 
34 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act, 
1982].  As noted, the duty to consult is closely linked to the protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights 
under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 35 (1) reads: “The existing Aboriginal and treaty 
rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed” [emphasis added]. 
35 In Sparrow, supra note 4, Dickson CJC declared at 1103: “there was from the outset never any doubt 
that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to [their traditional] lands vested 
in the Crown.” The language of the Court in more recent judgments has been more nuanced. In Haida 
Nation, supra note 4, McLachlin CJC affirmed, at para 53, that the duty to consult “flows from the 
Crown’s assumption of sovereignty over lands and resources formerly held by the Aboriginal group.” 
Elsewhere, however, the judgment refers to “assumed Crown sovereignty”, “sovereignty claims”, and 
“asserted Crown sovereignty” (see paras 20, 26).  For thoughtful critiques of the Court’s treatment of 
sovereignty, see John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 537 [Borrows, “Alchemy”]; Darlene Johnston, “Lo, how 
Sparrow has fallen: A Retrospective of the Supreme Court of Canada’s Section 35 Jurisprudence” in 
Julia Bass, WA Bogart & Frederick H Zemans, eds, Access to Justice for a new Century: The Way 
Forward (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005) at 197; and Kent McNeil, “The Jurisdiction of 
Inherent Right Aboriginal Governments” Research Paper for the National Centre for First Nations 
Governance (October 11, 2007), online: <www.fngovernance.org/publications>. 
36 Sparrow, supra note 4.  
37 Ibid at 1113.  
38 Ibid at 1119. 
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measures that might limit Aboriginal rights, the Court’s unanimous judgment made 
clear that it viewed the constitutional protection of Aboriginal rights as “a solid 
constitutional base upon which subsequent negotiations can take place.”39 
In several cases following Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada 
confirmed the importance of prior consultation in disputes over an alleged 
infringement of Aboriginal rights.40 Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court of 
Canada definitively ruled that the failure to consult with Aboriginal communities 
was not merely a factor to be considered ex post facto during judicial review of 
alleged violations of proven Aboriginal or treaty rights. Consultation, the Court 
declared in Haida Nation, is a process that the Crown is duty-bound to engage in 
whenever it considers measures that it knows or ought to know might interfere with 
the section 35 rights asserted by an Aboriginal community. To hold otherwise, the 
Court ruled, would be to permit the Crown in the interim to “run roughshod” over 
credible section 35 claims and thus to undermine the purpose of section 35: the 
reconciliation of Aboriginal peoples with the sovereignty asserted by the Crown.41 
The requirement to consult Aboriginal peoples, as elaborated by the 
Supreme Court does not generally require that federal and provincial governments 
obtain the free and prior consent of Aboriginal communities either to the substance 
of development proposals that might affect those communities’ constitutional rights 
or to the Crown’s proposed response to Aboriginal concerns. Instead, those 
governments must engage in a dialogue that permits them to understand and assess 
the community’s perspective as to the scope of its rights and the potential impacts of 
the proposed decision. If the rights claim is relatively strong and the impacts 
significant, the government must consider ways of accommodating the community’s 
interests and minimizing the potential impacts. As we have seen, both sides in the 
dialogue must engage with each other in good faith. In general, however, under 
current Canadian law, the Aboriginal community has no right to veto the proposed 
decision.  
One circumstance in which Canadian law does require Indigenous peoples’ 
consent to the use of their traditional lands is where a court has confirmed that those 
lands are still subject to Aboriginal title. Upon proof that the lands in question were 
exclusively occupied by an Indigenous people at the time the Crown asserted 
sovereignty, and have never been the subject of either a land treaty or valid 
legislative extinguishment prior to 1982, an Aboriginal group obtains the sole right 
to use and control those lands and to enjoy the benefits that flow from them.42 In 
such a case, absent consent to a Crown proposal to make use of their resources, the 
Crown may only proceed if it can prove that it fulfilled its duty of consultation, that 
the project is justified by a compelling and substantial objective, and that proceeding 
                                                
39 Ibid at 1105.  
40 See R v Nikal, [1996] 1 SCR 1013 at para 110, R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723 at para 64 [Gladstone], 
and Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para 168. 
41 Haida Nation, supra note 4 at 526−29. 
42 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at para 2 [Tsilhqot’in]. 
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with the project is consistent with the Crown's fiduciary duty to the Indigenous 
titleholders.43 At a minimum, this means that the Crown’s objective “must further the 
goal of reconciliation, having regard to both the Aboriginal interest and the broader 
public objective.” 44  At the time of writing, the application of this qualified 
requirement of Indigenous consent to the development of their traditional lands 
(subject to overriding Crown justification) has been confirmed for just one tract of 
land in Canada, comprising some 1700 square kilometres in south-central British 
Columbia, or about .0002 per cent of Canada’s land mass.45 It is the less onerous 
duty to consult that will generally apply in areas where Aboriginal title has been 
asserted but not yet confirmed (as in the great majority of British Columbia), and in 
territories covered by historical land treaties.46 
Returning to the scope of the free and prior informed consent principle set 
out in the UNDRIP, two further points of distinction are worth noting. First, the 
UNDRIP consent requirement applies not just to incursions on Indigenous lands but 
also to the adoption or implementation of any “legislative or administrative measures 
that may affect” Indigenous peoples.47 As we have seen, Canadian law as it currently 
stands is not so broad, requiring consultation with Aboriginal communities only 
where a measure may affect Aboriginal or treaty rights that are protected by section 
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.48 
                                                
43 Ibid, at para 77. On the distinction between proposals to regulate aboriginal title lands and proposals to 
make use of the resources thereon, see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Provinces after 
Tsilhqot’in Nation” (2015) SCLR (2d) 67 at 78−85 [McNeil, “Aboriginal Title after Tsilhqot’in”]. 
44 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 42 at para 82. 
45  The World Bank, “Data” online: <data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2>. The area 
described (which excludes inland waters) is part of the traditional lands of the Tsilhqot’in people and 
was declared subject to Aboriginal title by the Supreme Court of Canada in Tsilhqot’in, supra note 42. 
The Supreme Court has thus far refrained from seeking to summarize all of the circumstances where an 
infringement on established rights would give rise to an obligation to obtain Aboriginal consent (subject 
to justifiable infringement). Such consent would presumably also be required for development on 
settlement lands under modern treaties and possibly for development on reserve lands set aside under 
the historical treaties. 
46 The duty to consult arises even where a historical treaty expressly provides for the taking up of treaty 
lands by the Crown: see Mikisew, supra note 8 at para 56 and Grassy Narrows First Nation v Ontario 
(Natural Resources) 2014 SCC 48 at para 51[Grassy Narrows].  
47 UNDRIP, supra note 12, Article 19. 
48 Further, the Supreme Court of Canada has left open the question of whether governmental conduct in 
enacting legislation is itself subject to the duty to consult. See Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani 
Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43 at para 44 [Rio Tinto]. Canada’s lower courts have divided on this issue. 
See R v Lefthand, 2007 ABCA 206, 77 Alta LR (4th) 203 at paras 37−40 (holding that no duty to 
consult can arise prior to the passage of legislation) and Courtoreille v Canada (Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development), 2014 FC 1244 [Courtoreille]. In Courtoreille, the court ruled that upon the 
introduction of “omnibus” changes to environmental legislation government, ministers owed an 
obligation to consult with the Mikisew Cree about the potential impacts of the legislation on their treaty 
rights.  The interaction between the courts’ powers to supervise the duty to consult and the legislative 
process raises issues concerning the separation of powers between the courts and the legislative branch. 
For more on this subject, see Ross River Dena Council v Government of Yukon, 2012 YKA 14, 358 
DLR (4th) 100.  
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Second, in relation to development proposals, Article 32 of the UNDRIP 
calls for Indigenous peoples’ consent when such projects affect “their lands or 
territories and other resources.”49 Nowhere does the UNDRIP clarify whether this 
provision is intended to apply to areas that have already been the subject of a land 
treaty. In those areas, has the necessary consent already been obtained? This is a 
complex and important question. Under Canadian law, the presence of a land treaty 
does not obviate the need for consultation with Indigenous communities before 
decisions by the Crown that may affect the continuing exercise of their treaty 
rights.50 On the other hand, a statement in the recent judgment of the Supreme Court 
of Canada, in Grassy Narrows First Nation v Ontario (Natural Resources),51 seems 
to suggest that in the case of interferences with treaty harvesting rights on 
surrendered lands the consultation obligations of federal and provincial governments 
may be very limited. The Grassy Narrows decision focused on a narrow question: 
whether the federal government was required by the terms of Treaty 3 to be involved 
in decisions to take up Crown lands in the treaty area for development. Dismissing 
that claim, the Court noted that the taking up of lands required provincial 
consultation with the Indigenous communities affected.  However, one passage in the 
judgment (repeating a comment made in Mikisew), might be interpreted as 
confirming that the Crown’s consultation obligations will be somewhat limited 
where it interferes with treaty harvesting rights, unless the Crown’s actions would 
leave the Indigenous treaty partner with no meaningful harvesting rights at all.52 The 
comment was peripheral to the issues before the Court, but the broader issue it raises 
regarding the accommodation of Indigenous concerns in treaty areas is a very 
significant one, which will be addressed in the next section of this analysis.  
On balance, the Canadian law of consultation provides a powerful tool for 
Aboriginal peoples: one that limits the freedom of action of Crown representatives in 
approving projects that may affect their rights. It provides for Aboriginal 
participation in decisions that will affect them and promotes more informed decision-
making by Crown representatives. At the same time, however, the framework of the 
                                                
49 UNDRIP, supra note 12, Article 32.  
50 Mikisew, supra note 8 at paras 53−57. Treaty 8 held to provide Cree with procedural rights to 
consultation in addition to the substantive obligations of the parties that flowed from the 1899 treaty. 
51 Grassy Narrows, supra note 46. 
52 Ibid at para 52. In Grassy Narrows, the Court was dealing with a common provision in the historical 
numbered treaties which recognizes the Crown’s right to “take up” treaty lands for public purposes. In 
such circumstances, the Court had earlier ruled in Mikisew, supra note 8, the Crown remains duty-
bound to consult with Aboriginal groups about impacts on their harvesting rights under the treaty but 
the taking up may not in fact violate the substantive rights guaranteed by the treaty unless the impact on 
those rights is severe. Citing a statement from Mikisew to similar effect, in Haida Nation, supra note 4, 
McLachlin CJC declared that: “Not every taking up will constitute an infringement of the harvesting 
rights set out in Treaty 3. This said, if the taking up leaves the Ojibway with no meaningful right to 
hunt, fish or trap in relation to the territories over which they traditionally hunted, fished, and trapped, a 
potential action for treaty infringement will arise” [emphasis added]. Given that the extent of the 
Crown’s duty to consult is determined in large part by the severity of the impact of its proposal on the 
rights of the Aboriginal community, the Court’s statement seems to imply that the Crown faces less of a 
burden of accommodating Aboriginal concerns about land use decisions in the vast areas covered by the 
numbered treaties. 
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duty to consult, as articulated thus far, pays little heed to the interest of Aboriginal 
peoples in helping to shape the process through which the dialogue will occur to 
ensure that it takes due consideration of their own unique worldviews. Further, 
although the framework is aimed, at least in part, at promoting reconciliation, it 
offers minimal assistance to the parties as to how, or even whether they should 
resolve disagreements that arise during consultations. To date, federal and provincial 
implementation of the duty to consult in Canada has not eliminated the eruption of 
protracted disputes with Indigenous communities over developments on traditional 
lands. Those conflicts have frequently taken the form of expensive and complex 
litigation, damaging relationships between Indigenous communities, Crown 
representatives, and resource companies.53 In two cases over the past ten years, 
resistance to development projects has led to the imprisonment of eight Aboriginal 
leaders and community members.54 Failure to resolve conflicts that arise during 
consultations creates uncertainty for proposed resource development companies and 
can threaten the completion of exploration and development projects.55 There can be 
little question that concern about current consultation practices is one of the factors 
that has led a growing number of Canadian companies to declare that they will seek 
the consent of Indigenous peoples to projects involving development on traditional 
Indigenous lands. 
Can the duty of the Crown to consult with Aboriginal peoples under 
Canadian law be interpreted in a manner that reflects more closely the principles 
underlying the standard of free, prior and informed consent, particularly their rights 
as peoples to shape their destinies in accordance with their own distinctive cultural 
values? Is it possible to implement the duty to consult in a manner that better 
promotes reconciliation, through more effective dialogue and consensus-building 
between Aboriginal peoples and the state? The next two sections of our analysis will 
suggest modest answers to these questions that flow from existing principles of 
Canadian law. 
                                                
53 The trial alone of the Tsilhqot’in case took 339 sitting days over five years, the pretrial examination of 
Chief Roger Williams saw him respond to 11,042 questions, and the cost of the trial, excluding appeals, 
has been estimated at $30 million. See Lawson Lundell Aboriginal Law Group, “The Tsilhqot’in Nation 
v. British Columbia Case: What It Means and What It Doesn’t Mean”, 
online: <www.worldservicesgroup.com/publications.asp?action=article&artid=2189>. 
54 See Frontenac Ventures Corporation v Ardoch Algonquin First Nation, 2008 ONCA 534 [Frontenac] 
and Platinex Inc v Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation, 2008 ONCA 533 [Platinex CA]. Both 
cases reduced custodial sentences imposed on Indigenous leaders for contempt of court in refusing to 
abide by injunctions. In the latter case, the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of five elected 
leaders and a community member from their six-month prison sentence after the mineral exploration 
company involved advised the court that it did not oppose the appeal. As noted by MacPherson JA at 
para 3: “Platinex Inc., informed the court that it would not be opposing the appeal because ‘the 
appellants have spent enough time in jail, the matter will ultimately be settled only through negotiation, 
and no good purpose would be served by keeping the appellants in jail any longer.’” 
55 For a brief review of the recent impact of consultation issues and the current climate for resource 
development in Canada, see Dwight Newman, “The Rule And Role Of Law: The Duty to Consult, 
Aboriginal Communities, and the Canadian Natural Resource Sector” (May 2014) Macdonald-Laurier 
Institute, Aboriginal Canada and the Natural Resource Economy Series at 9−17, online: 
<www.usask.ca/icngd/publications/reports/Reports-
Files/MLI%20Duty%20to%20Consult_May%202014.pdf>. 
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II. STRENGTHENING THE FRAMEWORK OF CONSULTATIONS WITH ABORIGINAL 
PEOPLES IN CANADA 
Q.  What’s your view of those penalties that Platinex is seeking against 
you?  
A.  [L]ike I said, we’re in a difficult financial problem, we’re in a deficit.  
And personally myself too, I don’t have that kind of cash to pay fines. 
So the only thing I have left is my good health, not my youth, but I’m 
willing to go jail and spend time and hopefully Platinex will go away. 
That’s a good trade off. You’d assume he’d take it and that’s why I 
promised to appear here.  I’m willing to give myself up for the belief 
that I belong up there, it’s my land and I have an obligation to protect 
it too…56   
The outcome of the failed consultation in the Platinex case was a particularly 
unfortunate one. The refusal of the Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation to 
consent to uranium exploration on their traditional lands, even after a court ordered 
them to permit exploration, came after the First Nation had already incurred some 
$650,000 in legal costs.57 Although the dispute arose after the judgment in Haida 
Nation, the Ontario government had, in the words of the trial judge, “been almost 
completely absent in the consultation process…and abdicated its responsibility and 
delegated its duty to consult” to the junior mining company involved.58 Unable to 
obtain the community’s consent to exploration, the company sued the First Nation, 
apparently in the amount of $10 billion.59 After prison sentences were imposed on 
the Chief and five other members of the First Nation, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
intervened, as we have seen, to reduce those sentences to time served.60 Finally, 
faced with no realistic way for the company to proceed with the exploration, the 
government of Ontario reportedly spent some $5,000,000 to purchase the company’s 
exploration interest.61  
The circumstances of the Platinex dispute were in some respects 
exceptional, but they illustrate the potential costs of failing to achieve consensus over 
                                                
56 See the examination of Chief Donny Morris at the sentencing hearing for contempt of court. Court 
Transcript, Platinex Inc v Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug et al, Ontario Superior Court, January 25, 
2008 [“Platinex Sentencing Transcript”] at 25−26. 
57 According to counsel for the First Nation: see ibid at 137. Further, at 102, counsel for Platinex Inc 
estimated that the overall legal costs of the dispute, excluding disbursements for travel and translation, 
exceeded $2,000,000. 
58 Platinex Inc v Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation (2006), 272 DLR (4th) 727 (Ont Sup Ct) at 
para 92. 
59 See Rachel Ariss & John Cutfeet, “Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation: Mining, Consultation, 
Reconciliation and Law” (2011) 10 Indigenous LJ 1 at 20. 
60 The six-month sentences were thus reduced to nine weeks. See Platinex CA, supra note 54 at para 2. 
61  See Karen Mazurkewich, “Losing Ground” FinancialPost Magazine (April 2010) 20, online: 
<www.republicofmining.com/2010/12/12/ontario-mining-losing-ground-–-karen-mazurkewich-
originally-published-in-financial-post-magazine-april-2010-issue>. For a review of the background to 
and legal issues raised by the Platinex dispute, see Ariss & Cutfeet, supra note 59 at 34.  
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developments on the traditional lands of an Indigenous people. Beyond the human 
and financial costs of failure for those directly involved looms the indirect cost of 
economic uncertainty as to the conditions upon which development may proceed. 
Further, dialogic processes that do not attend sufficiently to Indigenous worldviews 
risk leaving Indigenous peoples feeling further marginalized by Canadian law. 
Finally, failed processes of engagement may damage existing relationships between 
Indigenous peoples and federal and provincial governments. In short, the 
consequences of failed and ineffective consultation processes may be just as severe 
as not consulting at all.  
Recognizing that the issues that arise in conflicts between Aboriginal 
peoples and the Crown over proposed developments are likely to be complex and 
polycentric, the Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly urged that they should be 
addressed through negotiation – a flexible process capable of handling those 
complexities.62 As we have seen, Aboriginal groups do not have the right to 
unilaterally veto the substance of proposed developments on their traditional lands, 
except in the case of proved Aboriginal title claims and, perhaps, in the case of 
proposals to significantly intrude on proved Aboriginal rights.63 The alternative is 
arguably unsustainable: allowing one group to override existing regulatory processes 
on the basis of merely asserting that it holds rights that would be affected. It might 
also create apparently intractable problems where more than one Aboriginal 
community will be affected by a Crown proposal and those Aboriginal communities 
disagree among themselves about the merits of that proposal. The counterweight 
offered by the Court is an obligation of both parties to engage in dialogue, nuanced 
and general directions about the process they must undertake, and the factors that 
should guide the outcome of that process. Implicit in those directions, however, are 
more specific principles that pay heed to the voice of the Indigenous people involved 
and strengthen the capacity of the process to command the respect of both parties 
and assist them to manage disagreement. 
The first of these principles is that the Indigenous group affected must have 
a reasonable opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the shape of the process 
through which their concerns will be heard. The duty to consult requires that 
consultation must be in good faith, “with the intention of substantially addressing the 
concerns of the Aboriginal peoples whose lands are at issue.” 64  Good faith 
consultation has an informational component: the Crown must provide all necessary 
information in a timely way. 65  Listening and seeking to understand concerns 
expressed in dialogue with an Indigenous group also has a cultural component. 
Concerns expressed about developments on traditional lands and their impacts on the 
environment, traditional activities, and the web of relations between plants, animals 
                                                
62 See e.g. Sparrow, supra note 4 at 1105, Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para 186 (Lamer CJC), and Haida 
Nation, supra note 4 at paras 14, 20, 25, 26, 38. 
63 See Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para 168 and Haida Nation, supra note 4 at para 48. 
64 Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para 168, Mikisew, supra note 8 at para 51, and (paraphrased in) Haida 
Nation, supra note 4. 
65 Mikisew, supra note 8 at para 64. 
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and the spirit world are not mere empirical assertions. They flow from and are 
intimately shaped by the distinctive cultures, traditional legal orders, and worldviews 
of those expressing the concerns. A process that does not create a space for those 
distinctive worldviews will fail to produce a proper understanding of the relevance 
and significance of those concerns and limit its capacity to accommodate those 
concerns. Thus, a process that seeks to permit Crown representatives to understand 
and assess Indigenous concerns must be structured in a manner that is conducive to 
appreciation of the cultural context and significance of those concerns. This 
conclusion, as we have seen, is consistent with international interpretations of the 
states’ obligations in consulting with Indigenous peoples. 
A dialogic process that seeks to take Indigenous concerns seriously must 
come to grips with a cultural reality in which one of the parties to the dialogue does 
not typically conceive of development decisions concerning traditional lands as 
merely affecting their rights and “interests”.  For most, if not all, Aboriginal peoples 
in Canada, traditional norms dictate that living properly requires a focus on 
maintaining proper relationships – with other persons and with the natural and 
spiritual world. Inupiat/Inuvialuit legal scholar Gordon Christie puts it this way: 
At the heart of Aboriginal belief systems are senses of responsibility 
demanding that Aboriginal peoples resist being reconceived, either as 
liberal moral agents or as free-floating, self-creating boundary-less beings. 
While Aboriginal people may feel comfortable with the communitarian 
leanings of the critical theorist's vision (for individuals in Aboriginal 
societies are seen as interwoven into intricate webs of relationships, the 
self being defined in its relation to others), nevertheless individuals are 
conceptualized in Aboriginal societies as nodes in these webs, as relatively 
fixed and determined beings connected by strands of the web. The identity 
of these individuals (and the various communities they collectively 
comprise) is provided by the responsibilities they have, which work to 
weave the web of which they are parts.66  
Good-faith efforts to understand and accommodate Indigenous concerns 
about proposed changes to the use of traditional lands must take into account the 
potential differences in the parties’ cultural perspectives and allow space for the 
                                                
66 Gordon Christie, “Law, Theory and Aboriginal Peoples” (2003) 2 Indigenous LJ 67 at 110−11. For 
more on the importance of indigenous concepts of “right relations”, see John Borrows, Canada’s 
Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 77−79 and Leanne Simpson, 
“Looking after Gdoo-naaganinaa: Precolonial Nishnaabeg Diplomatic and Treaty Relationships” 
(2008) 23:2 Wicazo Sa Rev 29. For more on the impact of worldviews on cross-cultural understanding 
and communications, see Leroy Littlebear, “Jagged Worldviews Colliding” in Marie Battiste, ed, 
Reclaiming Indigenous Voice and Vision (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000). The 
influence of the Indigenous emphasis on relations rather than stipulated rights is reflected in the 
Kaswentha, or Two-Row Wampum, exchanged by the British Crown with Indigenous leaders at the 
1764 Treaty of Niagara and in the “Covenant Chain” agreements entered by the British and the 
Indigenous peoples of eastern North America and the Great Lakes region. See John Borrows, 
“Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and Self-Government” in 
Michael Asch, ed, Essays on Law, Equity, and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1997) at 155−69 and Mark D Walters, “Brightening the Covenant Chain: Aboriginal 
Treaty Meanings in Law and History After Marshall” (2001) 24 Dalhousie LJ 75.  
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parties to explore solutions that respect both perspectives. This conclusion also flows 
from the fact that the duty to consult arises from the assertion of inter-societal rights. 
Determining the existence and scope those rights, the Supreme Court has made clear, 
requires due attention to the distinct perspectives of the Aboriginal peoples 
involved.67  
In administrative and negotiation processes aimed at understanding 
Indigenous concerns, Indigenous representatives must have an opportunity to 
contribute to the shaping of the process in which their concerns will be expressed. 
For Crown representatives to unilaterally dictate the terms of the process in which 
Indigenous concerns may be expressed risks privileging non-Indigenous perspectives 
about the nature and significance of those concerns. The tendency for minority 
cultural perspectives to be marginalized in cross-cultural dialogue may be 
unconscious, but it is a well-understood phenomenon.68 This tendency exists because 
of cultural differences in communication patterns, including differences in the 
significance attributed to the context of the dialogue, as well as culturally-inflected 
differences in what is perceived as socially acceptable or persuasive forms of 
argument. Unless both parties in the dialogue take steps to counteract the effect of 
the obstacles to effective cross-cultural communication, interlocutors from the 
dominant culture are at risk of unconsciously attributing those effects to the 
“ineffective” arguments of their negotiation counterparts. In the context of the duty 
to consult Indigenous peoples, this is a tendency that may be exacerbated by the 
law’s emphasis on the balancing of Aboriginal and societal “interests.” 69 The 
Supreme Court of Canada’s use of the term is clearly intended to broadly encompass 
Indigenous concerns related to a proposed intrusion on their rights. Still, care must 
be taken to ensure that in cross-cultural consultations the word “interests” is not 
interpreted by Crown representatives solely in accordance with its frequent Euro-
Canadian connotation of material, legal, or economic priorities.70 The logical way to 
                                                
67 In the context of Aboriginal rights, see Sparrow, supra note 4 at 1112: ”While it is impossible to give an 
easy definition of fishing rights, it is possible, and, indeed, crucial, to be sensitive to the Aboriginal 
perspective itself on the meaning of the rights at stake.” The principle applies equally to treaty rights 
claims and to Aboriginal title claims: see R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456 at para 19 (on the “need to 
give balanced weight to the Aboriginal perspective” about the meaning of a treaty); and Delgamuukw, 
supra note 4 at para 81 (on the significance of the Aboriginal perspective and the perspective of the 
common law in Aboriginal title cases, as with Aboriginal rights cases, “[t]rue reconciliation will, 
equally, place weight on each”). 
68  In the context of negotiations involving Indigenous peoples, see Toby Rollo, “Mandates of the State:  
Canadian Sovereignty, Democracy, and Indigenous Claims” (2014) 27 Can JL & Jur 225 and Michael 
Coyle, “Establishing Indigenous Governance: The Challenge of Confronting Mainstream Cultural 
Norms” in G Otis & M Papillon, eds, Federalism and Aboriginal Governance (Québec City: Presses de 
l’Université Laval, 2013). For the influence of culture on communications in negotiations generally, see 
Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) especially 
chapters 2 and 3, Jeswald W Salacuse, “Ten Ways that Culture Affects Negotiating Style: Some Survey 
Results” (1998) 14 Negotiation Journal 221, John Barkai, “What’s A Cross-Cultural Mediator To Do? 
A Low-Context Solution For A High-Context Problem” (2008) 10 Cardozo J of Conflict Resolution 43. 
69 The judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Haida Nation, supra note 4, uses the word “interests” 
in this sense 27 times. 
70 For an argument that the word “interests” in the context of interest-based negotiation theory is quite 
capable of encompassing culturally significant values, see Michael Coyle, “Negotiating Indigenous 
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ensure that both parties’ concerns are considered in their full context is to design 
consultation processes through an iterative process that solicits and incorporates both 
of their perspectives.  
Negotiating the form of consultation processes that reflect the values of 
both consultation partners also increases the legitimacy of those processes, and their 
outcomes, in the view of Indigenous peoples. From the perspective of dispute 
resolution theory, participation by both parties in the design of a conflict resolution 
process is likely to enhance respect for the outcome of the process. But legal systems 
also have a critical need to attend to the question of whether the laws they produce 
command the respect of those who will be subject to the law.71 The issue of 
legitimacy is a particularly vital one for Canadian law as it relates to Indigenous 
peoples. In a thoughtful examination of this issue, Professor Mark Walters has posed 
the question of “whether Canadian Aboriginal law is sufficiently grounded in a 
reciprocal relationship of respect between the Canadian state and Aboriginal peoples 
for it to constitute “law” in a meaningful sense, rather than mere power or force.”72 
Respect and reciprocal dialogue lie, of course, at the heart of the duty to consult in 
Canadian law. The duty to consult is part of an ongoing process of fair dealing and 
reconciliation through dialogue between Indigenous peoples and representatives of 
the Crown. The duty embodies a “generative constitutional order” that in turn relies 
on continued dialogue with Aboriginal peoples.73 In the words of McLachlin CJC 
writing for the entire court in Rio Tinto, the duty to consult is “[c]oncerned with an 
ethic of ongoing relationships” and seeks to further an ongoing process of 
reconciliation by articulating a preference for remedies “that promote ongoing 
                                                                                                               
Peoples’ Exit From Colonialism: Are Interest-Based Strategies The Right Approach?” (2014) 27 Can JL 
& Jur 283 [Coyle, “Interest-Based Strategies”].  British Columbia, however, is one example of a 
Canadian provincial government that appears to adopt a particularly narrow interpretation of the 
meaning of “interests” within the duty to consult. Their current consultation policy indicates that for the 
purposes of the document “‘Aboriginal Interests’ will be used generally to refer to claimed or proven 
Aboriginal rights (including title) and treaty rights that require consultation.” See British Columbia, 
“Updated Procedures For Meeting Legal Obligations When Consulting First Nations” (May 7, 2010) at 
5, online: <www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/environment/natural-resource-stewardship/consulting-with-
first-nations> [“BC Consultation Procedures”] [emphasis added]. 
71 For a famous treatment of this point, see Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev ed (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1969). For Fuller, “[t]he functioning of a legal system depends upon a 
cooperative effort - an effective and responsible interaction - between lawgiver and subject” (at 219). 
For a discussion of Fuller’s theory in the context of indigenous-state relations in Canada, see Mark 
Walters, “The Morality of Aboriginal Law” (2005) 31 Queen’s LJ 470 [Walters, “Morality of 
Aboriginal Law”] and Jean Leclair, “Nanabush, Lon Fuller and Historical Treaties: The Potentialities 
and Limits of Adjudication” in Coyle & Borrows, supra note 33. 
72 Walters, “Morality of Aboriginal Law”, ibid at 473. On the legitimacy of Euro-Canadian law in 
relationship to Aboriginal peoples. See also John Borrows, “Creating an Indigenous Legal Community” 
(2005) 50 McGill LJ 153 at 168: “We have a real crisis in the rule of law in Aboriginal communities. 
And it is not a crisis because Aboriginal peoples don’t have the rule of law; it is a crisis of legitimacy 
about the rule of law and Aboriginal communities. If Aboriginal peoples were able to start to see 
themselves and their normative values reflected in how they conduct their day-to-day affairs, I believe 
that would go at least some distance to diminishing some of the problems that we have. It is not the 
whole solution, but it is a part of the solution.” 
73 See Rio Tinto, supra note 48 at para 38. The Court drew the language of generative constitutional order 
from Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 29 SCLR (2d) 433. 
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negotiations.”74 Consultation processes imposed by the Crown that focus only on 
non-Indigenous values and cultural perspectives are not only unlikely to obtain the 
respect of Indigenous peoples; they cannot hope to advance the process of 
reconciliation with Indigenous peoples and as such are inconsistent with Canadian 
law. 
While the central purpose of the duty to consult requires that Aboriginal 
peoples be invited to negotiate the process under which consultations will occur, 
current federal and provincial consultation policies rarely require the participation of 
Aboriginal groups in the design of the processes through which their concerns will 
be discussed. All of these policies summarize the Canadian jurisprudence on the duty 
to consult and direct relevant government ministries and agencies to implement 
procedures consistent with that jurisprudence. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the current 
policies focus on the mechanics of implementation: when consultation should occur, 
which Aboriginal groups should be consulted, the role of industry proponents in 
consultations, the formal elements of consultation, considerations to be taken into 
account by decision-makers, and coordination between the consulting ministry or 
agency and other government departments. The current federal guidelines, for 
example, are presented in a relatively detailed document comprising 69 pages.75 The 
document seeks to summarize the substance of the duty to consult, promote 
integrated and consistent decision-making within the federal government, and 
harmonize that decision-making with the policies of provincial and territorial 
governments. The guidelines indicate that federal officials should develop processes 
that will “facilitate” the inclusion of Aboriginal perspectives. 76  They do not, 
however, require that Aboriginal peoples affected by a particular process be invited 
to participate in the design of the process.77 Nor do the policy guidelines issued to 
date by the governments of Ontario or Quebec. 78  Neither does the current 
                                                
74 Ibid. 
75  Canada, Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation: 
Updated Guidelines to Fulfill the Duty to Consult (Ottawa: Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development, 2011), online: <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-
text/intgui_1100100014665_eng.pdf> [“Federal Consultation Guidelines”]. 
76 Ibid at 15. 
77 The Federal Consultation Guidelines do at least suggest (at 48) that federal officials “[c]onsider 
involving Aboriginal groups in the design of effective consultation processes.” The next sentence, 
however, suggests, that the goal here is not a broad dialogue on the general process. The paragraph 
continues: “For example, agreeing on meeting objectives, in advance, can help all parties to focus their 
efforts and develop effective working relations.” (See also page 23 of the guidelines on this point). 
Similarly, the guidelines suggest (at 48) that federal representatives may wish to familiarize themselves 
with any existing consultation protocol developed by the Aboriginal group as such a protocol “may 
become the starting point for a discussion on the process. Even so, however, federal officials “must 
follow the Updated Guidelines.” The guidelines describe appropriate coordination with provincial and 
territorial governments about consultation processes on more than 20 occasions. 
78 The draft consultation guidelines published by the government of Ontario indicate that in addition to 
listening to Aboriginal perspectives generally, “[i]n some instances, ministries may need to have 
discussions with the affected Aboriginal community or communities, to determine what processes or 
approaches should be used to consult with the communities” [emphasis added]. See Ontario, “Draft 
Guidelines for Ministries on Consultation with Aboriginal Peoples related to Aboriginal Rights and 
Treaty Rights”, online: <www.ontario.ca/page/draft-guidelines-ministries-consultation-aboriginal-
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consultation policy of the government of Alberta. The latter notes that industry 
proponents should be aware that some First Nations have developed their own 
preferred consultation procedures, but the policy expressly provides that such 
procedures need not be followed when consulting First Nations.79 Nowhere does the 
Alberta policy suggest that there may in fact be benefit to listening to First Nation 
perspectives on the design of an appropriate consultation process, or to taking into 
account the impact of distinctive First Nation worldviews about development 
decisions.  
There are notable exceptions. The consultation policy of the government of 
Manitoba expressly provides that Aboriginal communities should participate in the 
design of the consultation processes that they will take part in.80 The purpose of this, 
according to the Manitoba policy, is “to ensure the process is mutually acceptable.”81 
The government of British Columbia, for its part, has negotiated several regional 
“Reconciliation Protocols” that provide for the establishing of joint processes with 
First Nation groups for more effectively managing decisions about specific resources 
like timber, conservation plans and First Nation sharing in the benefits derived from 
those resources.82 Overall, however, the consultation policies developed by federal 
and provincial governments since Haida Nation pay little heed to the principle that 
Aboriginal consultation partners should have meaningful input into the processes 
through which decisions affecting their traditional lands will be made.83 
                                                                                                               
peoples-related-aboriginal-rights-and-treaty> [“Ontario Draft Guidelines”]. The consultation policy 
currently published by the Ontario Ministry of Northern Development and Mines makes no reference to 
developing consultation processes in concert with the Aboriginal groups affected. See Ontario, “MNDM 
Policy: Consultation and Arrangements with Aboriginal Communities at Early Exploration” (Ontario: 
Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, 2012), online: <www.mndm.gov.on.ca/sites/default/ 
files/aboriginal_exploration_consultation_policy.pdf>. For Quebec’s policy, see Quebec, “Interim 
Guide for Consulting the Aboriginal Communities” (Quebec Interministerial Support Group on 
Aboriginal Consultation, 2008), online: <www.autochtones.gouv.qc.ca/publications_documentation/ 
publications/guide_inter_2008_en.pdf>. 
79 Alberta, “The Government of Alberta’s Policy on Consultation with First Nations on Land and Natural 
Resource Management, 2013”, (Alberta: Government of Alberta, 3 June 2013) at 7, online: 
<indigenous.alberta.ca/documents/GoAPolicy-FNConsultation-2013.pdf>. 
80 Manitoba, “Interim Provincial Policy For Crown Consultations with First Nations, Métis Communities 
and Other Aboriginal Communities”, (Manitoba: Government of Manitoba, 4 May 2009) at 3, online: 
<www.gov.mb.ca/ana/pdf/pubs/interim_aboriginal_consultation_policy_and_guidelines.pdf>.  
81 Ibid at 4. 
82  See British Columbia, “Reconciliation and Other Agreements”, (British Columbia: Ministry of 
Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation), online: <www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/environment/natural-
resource-stewardship/consulting-with-first-nations/first-nations-negotiations/reconciliation-other-
agreements>.  
83 See “Federal Consultation Guidelines”, supra note 75. It should be noted on this point that the Federal 
Consultation Guidelines, at least, are not inconsistent with initiatives to negotiate consultation protocols 
with Aboriginal peoples. Indeed, at 23, the guidelines indicate that the Department of Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs will explore and negotiate “consultation arrangements and protocols” with Aboriginal 
groups and provinces (although the purpose of such arrangements is stated to be to achieve “efficient 
and coordinated” processes, rather than to incorporate Aboriginal values). It is unclear whether any such 
negotiations have begun. The “Ontario Draft Guidelines”, supra note 78, expressly contemplate 
Aboriginal peoples will at some point participate in developing the government’s final consultation 
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If providing Aboriginal peoples with a prior opportunity to negotiate the 
shape of consultation processes is a minimal requirement of good faith engagement 
aimed at reconciliation, one way to achieve this is for federal and provincial 
governments to seek consultation process agreements at the broader level of 
Indigenous nations and treaty partners. Engaging in dialogue with broader 
Indigenous groups offers the promise of mitigating, to some extent, the negotiation 
capacity problems faced by individual Indigenous communities. At the very least, 
such negotiations will offer valuable information to federal and provincial officials 
about the cultural and procedural norms that their consultation partners believe 
should be incorporated in the consultation process. Further, where historical treaties 
are in effect, Crown negotiations with Indigenous treaty partners over the process 
through which treaty concerns over development will be discussed during 
consultations would be consistent with the relationships established by the historical 
treaties, and a significant gesture toward reconciliation. In all such broader 
negotiations there is a risk that consensus will not be obtained. Indeed, consensus 
may not be achievable even among the communities on the Aboriginal side of the 
table. But the successful negotiation of agreements regarding the procedures that will 
be followed in implementing the duty to consult would increase the legitimacy of 
subsequent consultations about specific developments on traditional Indigenous 
lands.  
There is one other manifestation of good faith in consultations that is 
worthy of mention here: the willingness of both parties to negotiate and abide by 
timely dispute resolution procedures. Where consultation does not lead to consensus 
over whether or how to accommodate the concerns of the Aboriginal consultation 
partner, Crown representatives are currently required to decide how to proceed 
through a balancing of interests in good faith. The judgment in Haida Nation, 
however, indicates that in cases where there is a strong prima facie claim to a section 
35 right and a risk of significant potential intrusion on that right, the Crown may 
have additional obligations. In appropriate cases, these may include a requirement to 
provide written reasons that clarify how Aboriginal interests were taken into account 
in reaching the final decision.84 Although the Supreme Court expressly declined in 
Haida Nation to enumerate all of the Crown’s obligations in such cases, it is 
noteworthy that the Court suggested that in complex or difficult cases federal and 
provincial governments may consider adopting mediation or impartial administrative 
processes to help resolve disputes between the parties.85 
There can be no doubt that negotiation is generally the most flexible process 
for addressing the complex issues that may arise when the duty to consult is 
triggered. Negotiation, rather than a process which imposes an outcome on one party, 
                                                                                                               
policy. At least six provinces (Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Alberta, Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland and Labrador) have already engaged with Aboriginal peoples, at least to some extent, in 
the development of their province-wide consultation policies. See Newman, Revisiting, supra note 15 at 
118−27. 
84 Haida Nation, supra note 4 at para 44. 
85 Ibid. 
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is also the mechanism most likely to strengthen the parties’ relationship. 
Nevertheless, particularly in serious cases of significant potential intrusion on 
Aboriginal rights, it is inevitable that the parties will sometimes find themselves 
unable to move beyond an impasse over appropriate accommodation of the 
Aboriginal interest.86 In that event, it is of course open to the Indigenous group, if it 
has sufficient resources, to challenge the Crown’s decision in the courts. However, in 
cases where it is evident at the outset of the consultations that significant rights 
claims are involved, each party’s demonstrated willingness to negotiate timely and 
culturally-balanced dispute resolution procedures should be considered in 
determining whether the consultation was conducted in good faith.87  
As a matter of policy, a demonstrated willingness by the Crown to negotiate 
dispute resolution procedures at the outset of a consultation process, at least in cases 
where the group clearly has credible rights claims and significant prima facie 
concerns about the use of their traditional lands, would communicate clearly that 
federal and provincial governments intend to treat Indigenous peoples as equals 
under the law. Adopting such an approach to the resolution of consultation disputes 
would also bring Canadian practice closer to the principles set out in the UNDRIP. 
Article 27 of the UNDRIP provides as follows: 
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous 
peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent 
process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, 
customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of 
indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, 
including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or 
used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate in this 
process.88  
Particularly noteworthy here are the principles that Indigenous peoples should have 
the opportunity to participate in the development of procedures that address disputes 
between Indigenous peoples and the state, and that those procedures should 
incorporate Indigenous laws and customs.  
From the perspectives of both negotiation theory and legal legitimacy, the 
outcome of a dispute resolution procedure is more likely to be respected by both 
parties if it is a procedure that has been agreed by both sides and is consistent with 
                                                
86 Such impasses may arise because the parties honestly hold different views abut the strength of the 
Indigenous rights claim or about the desirability of the proposed accommodation. The power imbalance 
that typically characterizes dialogue between the state and Indigenous communities may further inhibit 
their ability to reach consensus. For an explanation of how power dynamics may affect negotiations 
between Indigenous communities and the Crown, see Christopher Alcantara, “To Treaty or Not to 
Treaty? Aboriginal Peoples and Comprehensive Land Claims Negotiations in Canada” (2008) 38 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 343. See also Michael Coyle, “Transcending Colonialism? Power 
and the Resolution of Indigenous Treaty Claims in Canada and New Zealand” (2011) 24:4 NZULR 596. 
87  The focus of such dispute resolution mechanisms would be on the adequacy of the particular 
consultation process, not on the merits of the underlying rights claims. 
88 UNDRIP, supra note 12, Article 27. 
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both sides’ norms and values. In the context of consultations between Aboriginal 
groups and the Crown, an effective procedure will apply the principles set out in 
Haida Nation through a process that is designed to take into account Aboriginal 
worldviews and calls upon third parties acceptable to both sides.89 Options available 
here range from, at the most intrusive end of the scale, appropriately constituted 
administrative bodies, to mediation, and procedures whereby one party can request 
the non-binding direction of an expert acceptable to both sides if the consultations 
reach an impasse. Faced with such impasses, Canadian courts have already issued 
orders requiring that consultations be assisted either by a neutral third party or by the 
court itself.90 The courts have not, thus far, required that the parties attempt at the 
outset to negotiate in good faith mutually-acceptable dispute resolution procedures, 
but such an interpretation of the law promotes consultation outcomes to which both 
parties have at least indirectly consented, and supports the reconciliatory purposes of 
section 35 and the duty to consult. Like the negotiation of consultation processes that 
take into account Indigenous values, it is not possible to guarantee that the parties 
will ultimately reach agreement on appropriate dispute resolution procedures, or to 
mandate such agreement by law. In both cases, however, for the reasons described 
above, it is appropriate for the law to encourage such agreements and to take into 
account the openness of Crown and Aboriginal representatives to attempt to 
negotiate agreement on these issues as evidence of their good faith in consultation. 
The consequence of recognizing that these principles flow from existing Canadian 
law is not to mandate that the substantive consent of Aboriginal peoples be obtained 
for all developments on their traditional lands, but rather to provide Aboriginal 
groups with a reasonable opportunity to offer their free, prior and informed consent 
to the process by which such development decisions will be assessed. 
III. BENEFIT-SHARING: A SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGE  
Thus far we have focused on procedural aspects of the duty to consult. If a proper 
understanding of the duty to consult reveals the need to attend to the procedural 
aspects of consultations aimed at respecting the Indigenous perspective, it is also 
necessary to consider an issue of substance: the allocation of benefits flowing from 
the use of traditional lands. Thus far, the Canadian jurisprudence on the duty to 
consult has paid little attention to the question of who benefits from developments on 
traditional lands. 91  Perhaps because of the way those cases were pleaded, in 
                                                
89 For a review of the relevant dispute resolution theory here, see Michael Coyle, “Interest-Based 
Strategies”, supra note 70 and Shin Imai, “Sound Science, Careful Policy Analysis, and Ongoing 
Relationships: Integrating Litigation and Negotiation in Aboriginal Lands and Resources Disputes” 
(2003) 41 Osgoode Hall LJ 587. 
90 See e.g. Ke-Kin-Is-Uqs v British Columbia (Minister of Forests) 2008 BCSC 1505 where the court 
granted an application by the Hupacasath First Nation for the appointment of an independent mediator 
to assist in ongoing consultation and accommodation discussions with the provincial Ministry of 
Forests. The court’s order retained supervisory jurisdiction over the issues in the event the parties 
required further direction or assistance. 
91 A notable exception is the decision of the Ontario Divisional Court in Waubauskang First Nation v. 
Minister of Northern Development and Mines et al, 2014 ONSC 4424 (Div Court). In that case the court 
rejected the First Nation’s application to set aside the Ministry’s approval of a company’s proposal for 
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identifying the substantive issues to be addressed in consultations, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has focused almost entirely on three issues: the nature and strength 
of the Aboriginal rights claim and the expected negative impacts of Crown action on 
traditional lands and the exercise of Aboriginal rights. The proposed sharing of 
benefits (if any) derived from the use of traditional lands has received much less 
attention in the consultation case law. Earlier decisions of the Supreme Court have 
identified the question of compensation to Aboriginal peoples as a factor to be 
considered when the Crown seeks to justify infringements on Aboriginal rights92, but 
the consultation process prescribed by the Court has not to date expressly identified 
the allocation of benefits as an issue to be discussed pursuant to the duty to consult. 93 
This lack of emphasis on benefit-sharing as a central issue during consultations is 
particularly striking in light of the long history in Canada of corporations negotiating 
“impact–benefit” agreements with Indigenous communities relating to proposed 
developments on traditional lands.94 Article 28 of the UNDRIP calls for Indigenous 
                                                                                                               
closure of a gold mine. The First Nation argued, on a number of grounds, that Ontario had failed to 
properly fulfil its duty to consult. One of those grounds was that the Province had a duty to consult 
regarding the sharing of benefits from the mine. In fact, the company and provincial officials had 
consulted with the First Nation over a period of three years and the company had attempted for almost a 
year to negotiate a benefit-sharing agreement in separate meetings with the First Nation. Writing for the 
Court, Kiteley J ruled that Ontario was not required to consult separately with respect to revenue 
sharing. Dealing with the issue in one paragraph, she noted that the First Nation had previously agreed 
that this issue was one that was to be negotiated between the First Nation and the company, changing its 
position only after the approval of the closure plan. Further, she found, on the record before the Court, 
that no such right arose from Treaty 3. For the reasons given in the text that follows, I submit that the 
Court’s ruling on this point should not be followed.  
92 See e.g. Sparrow, supra note 4 at 1119. As per Dickson CJC & Lamer J: “Within the analysis of 
justification, there are further questions to be addressed, depending on the circumstances of the inquiry. 
These include the questions of whether there has been as little infringement as possible in order to effect 
the desired result; whether, in a situation of expropriation, fair compensation is available…” [emphasis 
added].  See also Gladstone, supra note 40 at para 64 (where Crown regulates Aboriginal right to sell 
fish commercially, it must show “both that the process by which it allocated the resource and the actual 
allocation of the resource which results from that process reflect the prior interest”) and Delgamuukw, 
supra note 4 at para 69 (“[t]he economic aspect of aboriginal title suggests that compensation is relevant 
to the question of justification”). 
93 By way of example, in describing the issues to be addressed during consultations, the judgments in 
Haida Nation, supra note 4, and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment 
Director), 2014 SCC 74 [Taku River], each use the word “impacts” eight times in the context of the 
effects on the environment or intrusions on Aboriginal rights. By contrast, the word “benefit” is entirely 
absent in the Taku River judgment and appears twice in Haida Nation, both times in the context of the 
attributes of the claimed rights which gave rise to the duty to consult. The Grassy Narrows case, supra 
note 46, concerned a provincial decision to grant a license authorizing clear-cutting of forests within 
Treaty 3 territory in northwestern Ontario. The Court’s brief analysis of the appropriate subject of 
consultations about the approval (at para 52) referred to the impact of the project on section 35 
harvesting rights, but did not mention the distribution of the benefits of the development as a relevant 
issue. 
94 As their name suggests, impact-benefit agreements, typically negotiated between resource developers 
and Indigenous communities, inevitably provide for sharing of the financial, employment, and training 
opportunities created by the development, as well as measures to reduce its negative impacts on the 
community and its members. For a pragmatic summary of the procedural and substantive issues raised 
in the negotiation of an impact-benefit agreement, see Ginger Gibson & Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, “IBA 
Community Toolkit: Negotiation and Implementation of Impact and Benefit Agreements” (Toronto: 
Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation, 2010), online: <www.afoa.ca/afoadocs/L3/L3a%20-
%20IBA_toolkit_March_2010_low_resolution.pdf>. See also Brad Gilmour & Bruce Mellett, “The 
260 UNBLJ     RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 67 
 
peoples to receive “fair, just and equitable compensation” where states use their 
traditional lands without their prior consent.95 Finally, resource revenue benefit-
sharing in relation to the use of traditional lands has been the subject of several 
provincial initiatives in recent years.96 
To the extent that Canadian jurisprudence addresses the potential benefits 
deriving from developments on traditional lands, its emphasis so far has been on the 
benefits that stand to accrue to society at large. Thus, the benefits that may be 
obtained by the public at large – from logging, hydroelectric generation, economic 
development, and the “settlement of foreign populations” – may be taken into 
account as factors tending to justify for constitutional purposes developments on 
traditional lands that that infringe Aboriginal rights. 97  These types of benefits 
accruing to the public at large are also clearly relevant in the consultation process 
                                                                                                               
Role of Impact and Benefit Agreements in the Resolution of Project Issues with First Nations” (2013) 
51 Alta LR 385 and “Benefit Sharing Agreements in British Columbia: A Guide For First Nations, 
Businesses, And Governments” (Victoria: Woodward & Company, 2010), online: 
<www.for.gov.bc.ca/tasb/slrp/lrmp/nanaimo/cencoast/ebmwg_docs/hw03b_benefit_sharing_final_repor
t.pdf>. 
95 UNDRIP, supra note 12, Article 28. 
96 In 2002, the government of Quebec entered the La Paix des Braves Agreement following years of 
litigation between the government and the Grand Council of the Crees in Quebec. Among other things, 
the Agreement provides for revenue sharing with the Cree and greater Cree employment in the resource 
industries operating on their traditional lands. In 2009, Ontario announced a $30 million initiative as an 
interim step toward more comprehensive resource revenue sharing with Aboriginal communities. See 
Ontario, Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, “Partnering For Future Economic Growth: McGuinty 
Government Reaffirms Commitment To Resource Benefits Sharing With Aboriginal Communities” 
(Ontario: Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, 27 April 2009), online: 
<news.ontario.ca/maa/en/2009/04/partnering-for-future-economic-growth.html>. Since 2011, the 
government of British Columbia has negotiated more than one hundred agreements with First Nations 
that provide for sharing of the revenues from forestry. See “Forest Consultation and Revenue Sharing 
Agreements”, (British Columbia: Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation), online: 
<www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/environment/natural-resource-stewardship/consulting-with-first-
nations/first-nations-negotiations/forest-consultation-and-revenue-sharing-agreements>. The 
consultation policies of Nunavut and Newfoundland and Labrador expressly provide for the question of 
benefits to be addressed through negotiation with Aboriginal groups: see Newman Revisiting, supra 
note 15 at 124−25. 
97 All of thee factors were listed by Lamer CJC as relevant to the justification of Aboriginal title in 
Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para 165. As we have seen, these kinds of benefits accruing to the public 
may be relied upon by Crown to justify intrusion upon Aboriginal title even where the Crown has failed 
in its duty to consult the Aboriginal peoples involved: Haida Nation, supra note 4 at para 45. In the case 
of Aboriginal rights or treaty rights that have a commercial aspect, the pursuit of economic or regional 
fairness may amount to a valid legislative objective justifying infringement of the right: Gladstone, 
supra note 40 at para 75. The Supreme Court has not thus far gone so far in relation to treaty or 
Aboriginal rights that do not have a commercial aspect. There, the Court has not to date elaborated on 
the “valid legislative objective” test set out in Sparrow, supra note 4 (at 1113−1114) in which the goal 
of conserving a natural resource was the sole example given of a valid objective for infringing an 
Aboriginal right. The Court has been equally circumspect with respect to the infringement of non-
commercial treaty rights (see Badger, supra note 4 at paras 75-79 and Grassy Narrows, supra note 46 at 
para 53). See, however, Halfway River First Nation v British Columbia (Ministry of Forests) (1999), 
178 DLR (4th) 666 at 716 (BCCA), in which Finch JA reasoned that “the economic and cultural needs 
of all peoples and communities in the Province” could be relied on in justifying the infringement of 
treaty rights to hunt, trap and fish.  
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when the Crown seeks, as required by Haida Nation, “to balance societal and 
Aboriginal interests.”98 Logically, the allocation of these benefits as between peoples 
is relevant to both questions. Allocation is relevant to the question of whether 
“public” benefits justify Crown infringements on Aboriginal rights, because 
Aboriginal peoples form part of the “public” and because the justification test 
requires that the Crown act honourably in formulating and implementing measures 
that will affect Aboriginal rights. The same two considerations apply to the Crown’s 
duty to balance Aboriginal and societal interests during consultations over proposed 
infringements to claimed Aboriginal rights. Accordingly, although the consultation 
jurisprudence has not yet stated this explicitly, the consideration during consultation 
of the expected impacts of a development on an Aboriginal group must take into 
account whether and to what extent that group would benefit from the proposed 
development.99  
Whether the issue is examined, then, in the context of the honour of the 
Crown or the public interest, the share of benefits expected to flow to the Aboriginal 
group affected must be taken into account by the Crown in fulfilling its obligation to 
consult. However, the justification for Aboriginal peoples receiving a proportionate 
share of the benefits from developments on traditional lands does not lie merely in a 
parsing of the principles that comprise the duty to consult. Where Aboriginal peoples 
are being consulted because of significant proposed infringements on the exercise of 
their section 35 rights, a fair allocation of benefits is a minimum, although not 
sufficient,100 quid pro quo for the proposed infringement. Further, where traditional 
lands are subject to a historical treaty or to a credible claim of Aboriginal title, the 
Aboriginal people involved have a more direct claim, flowing from the nature of 
their section 35 rights, to share in the benefits flowing from development on those 
lands. The content of Aboriginal title directly confers on titleholders the de jure right 
to use and enjoy the fruits of the title lands.101 Canadian law has recognized since the 
Delgamuukw decision that infringement of Aboriginal title will ordinarily require 
fair compensation to the Aboriginal people affected.102 The Aboriginal partners of 
                                                
98 Haida Nation, supra note 4 at para 45.  
99 This must be assessed, of course, from the perspective of the Aboriginal group affected. 
100 The Crown remains obliged to consider, in response to Aboriginal concerns, whether the negative 
impacts of a proposed development can be reduced or eliminated. In cases where the anticipated 
damage to Aboriginal peoples’ rights and interests, and their relationship to the land, will be significant 
and long-lasting or permanent, a potential allocation of economic benefits may be insufficient to justify 
the proposed intrusion on their rights. The relevance of economic benefits, like the severity of the 
interference with Aboriginal rights, must be considered from the perspective of the Aboriginal people 
affected. Nonetheless, a failure to offer an honourable share of the benefits expected to flow from 
resource development to the Aboriginal groups whose rights are affected by the development may 
properly be considered as a factor to be considered in the determining whether the consultation was 
consistent with the honour of the Crown. 
101 In the words of McLachlin CJC, writing for the Court in Tsilhqot’in, supra note 42 at para 70: “[i]n 
simple terms, the title holders have the right to the benefits associated with the land — to use it, enjoy it 
and profit from its economic development.” 
102 Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para 169. 
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the Crown under historical treaties also have a legal right to share in the benefits 
derived from the use of their traditional lands, a point to which we will now turn. 
For more than 150 years following the Treaty of Niagara in 1764, Crown 
representatives entered into land treaties with Aboriginal peoples across the country. 
From the Crown’s perspective, the aim of those treaties was to free up land for 
settlement and the exploitation of its resources. The legal effect of those treaties was 
to transform Aboriginal title rights to treaty rights flowing from the understandings 
reached between the treaty partners. The written texts of those land treaties, drafted 
by Crown representatives, largely follow a very similar pattern. The Aboriginal 
treaty partner is recorded as having given up all interests in their traditional lands, 
apart from those relating to reserves to be set apart on their behalf and a continued 
right to hunt, fish and trap within their traditional territories. The latter right was 
generally described in the written texts as subject to the Crown’s right to take up 
treaty lands for development. Typically, the texts also provide for the payment of 
modest annuities and the provision of some goods to support agriculture and 
harvesting activities. The written version of Treaty 3, for example, the treaty 
considered in Grassy Narrows, states that the Crown will supply “to any band of the 
said Indians” who cultivates the soil: 
[T]wo hoes for every family actually cultivating, also one spade per family 
as aforesaid, one plough for every ten families as aforesaid, five harrows 
for every twenty families as aforesaid, one scythe for every family as 
aforesaid, and also one axe and one cross-cut saw, one hand-saw, one pit-
saw, the necessary files, one grind-stone, one auger for each band, and 
also for each Chief for the use of his band one chest of ordinary carpenter's 
tools…all the aforesaid articles to be given once for all for the 
encouragement of the practice of agriculture among the Indians.103  
The territory covered by Treaty 3, like most of the historical land treaties, 
was vast: it comprised some 55,000 square miles in what is now northwestern 
Ontario and eastern Manitoba. The area was known to be rich in valuable timber, 
gold, and other resources. It is possible to make the argument that its written text, 
like the texts of other land treaties, should be parsed like a contract of sale, and that 
the benefits to be derived by the Crown’s Aboriginal treaty partners from their 
traditional lands should be limited to the goods enumerated in the treaty, combined 
with an ever-diminishing right to engage in traditional harvesting activities. The 
assurances consistently offered by Crown representatives in the treaty negotiations, 
however, and the premises of the historical treaty-making process, belie this 
conclusion. The records kept by the Crown negotiators reveal that they repeatedly 
assured their Aboriginal counterparts that entering into a permanent treaty 
relationship with the Crown would provide for their peoples’ well-being “as long as 
the sun shines and the rivers flow.”104 Such assurances, together with other historical 
                                                
103  Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Treaty Texts – Treaty No 3” (Ottawa: Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs Canada), online: <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028675/1100100028679>. 
104 With reference to the negotiation of Treaty 3, see Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the 
Indians of Manitoba and the North-west Territories (Toronto: Prospero Books, 2000) at 53−56 [Morris, 
Treaties]. For other typical examples of the assurance, from the negotiation of Treaty 4 (1874) and 
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evidence of the common intention of the treaty parties, must be taken into account in 
the interpretation of the treaties. The argument that the benefits Aboriginal treaty 
peoples are entitled to derive from the treaty relationship are not limited to the 
discrete items enumerated in their written texts could undoubtedly be made on a 
case-by-case basis, based on each individual treaty negotiation.105 In each such case, 
interpretation of the parties’ common intention will be governed by the principle of 
the honour of the Crown, which prevents federal and provincial representatives today 
from arguing that historical land treaties were the product of sharp dealing by the 
Crown.106  
The argument need not be made in this manner, however. The conclusion 
that the form of benefit sharing from treaty lands must be understood as evolving 
over time follows from the inherent nature of the historical treaties. Treaties, the 
courts have recognized, give rise to sui generis, reciprocal obligations. The historical 
land treaties in particular are comprehensible only on the basis of certain necessary 
premises about how the new treaty relationship was intended to function. These 
essential premises give rise inexorably to a core set of principles that are required to 
make sense of, and therefore form the normative framework of, the new inter-
societal institution that was to govern the coexistence of settlers and Aboriginal 
peoples on the traditional lands of the latter. One of these necessary premises, for 
example, was that the representatives of those peoples had the authority to bind their 
peoples to that new relationship. This necessarily implies that in the treaty 
relationship, each treaty partner would have sufficient rights of self-determination to 
regulate the affairs of their people and to empower them to fulfil their treaty 
commitments. In terms of the benefits to be received by each people under the treaty, 
the historical land treaties were premised on their enduring indefinitely, long beyond 
the lifetimes of the generations that entered them. The treaty relationship, then, was 
designed to continue to govern the parties’ relationship over a period of such length 
that significant changes to the use of the treaty lands would inevitably occur. This 
leads to two further implications in terms of the normative structure of the institution 
of law created by those treaties. The first is that the historical treaty framework 
obligates Indigenous peoples and the Crown to remain in dialogue about their 
relationship under the treaty and to discuss appropriate changes to its implementation 
as changing circumstances on the treaty lands require. The second implication is that 
the historical land treaties, as an intersocietal institution created to ensure the 
harmonious coexistence of peoples in perpetuity, will not be interpreted or 
implemented in a manner that would force the impoverishment of either treaty 
                                                                                                               
Treaty 6 (1876), see Morris, Treaties, at 96, 202. Morris was the chief Crown negotiator for several of 
the numbered treaties.  
105 For a recent example of careful analysis of the common intention of the historical land treaties, see 
Michael Asch, On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Historical Rights in Canada (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2014).  
106 Badger, supra note 4 at para 41: “Interpretations of treaties and statutory provisions which have an 
impact upon treaty or aboriginal rights must be approached in a manner which maintains the integrity of 
the Crown.  It is always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises. No appearance of “sharp 
dealing” will be sanctioned.” 
264 UNBLJ     RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 67 
 
partner.107 As I have argued in more detail elsewhere,108 these implications of the 
historical treaty-making process are not mere background facts. As necessary shared 
premises of the treaty as a permanent, inter-societal institution, the obligation of 
ongoing dialogue to address changes in circumstance and the principle that the 
treaties will not be implemented in a manner that leads to the impoverishment of 
either treaty partner are fundamental legal principles that apply to all of the historical 
land-sharing treaties. 
The conclusion that the Crown shall not be permitted to interpret or 
implement historical treaties in a manner that leads to the impoverishment of its 
Aboriginal treaty partner might equally be reached by application of the obligations 
that flow from the honour of the Crown. However, recognizing that these 
fundamental treaty implementation principles necessarily flow from the historical 
treaty-making process places the law more firmly on a ground of equality – an 
equality based on the nature of the treaty partnership. Acknowledging the 
fundamental premises of the historical treaty-making process means that the 
implementation of those treaties can no longer viewed as a zero-sum game in which 
the value of the Aboriginal people’s treaty rights is doomed forever to diminish as 
the benefits flowing to the Crown from treaties continue to increase. Properly 
conceiving the historical treaties as giving rise to a unique institution of law 
governed by the shared premises that led to their creation leads to the 
acknowledgment of a generic right109 held by both treaty partners to continue to 
share meaningfully in the benefits that flow from their treaty lands. Finally, for the 
law to recognize the necessary premises of the historical treaty-making process is to 
recognize that Aboriginal peoples’ interest in sharing the benefits obtained from the 
treaties flows not merely from even-handed, after-the-fact stewardship by federal and 
provincial governments, but from the institutional nature of the treaties themselves. 
The obligation of the Crown representatives to address the issue of the 
allocation of benefits from traditional lands does not, therefore, arise only in the 
context of the existing law on the duty to consult in relation to specific development 
proposals. It is a broader obligation that flows from the nature of the historical 
treaties and the economic content of Aboriginal title. It is an obligation that the 
Crown must address honourably in negotiations with Aboriginal peoples who have 
prima facie claims to Aboriginal title and with those who have entered historical 
land-sharing treaties.110  
                                                
107 The analysis of treaties as institutions of law and the implications of such an analysis are developed 
more fully in Michael Coyle, “As Long as The Sun Shines…Recognizing that Treaties Were Intended 
to Last” in Coyle & Borrows, supra note 33. 
108 Ibid. 
109 For the general concept of Aboriginal generic rights, see Brian Slattery, “Making Sense Of Aboriginal 
And Treaty Rights” (2000) 79 Can Bar Rev 196 and Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour 
of the Crown” (2005) 29 SCLR (2d) 433. 
110 The words of McLachlin CJC at para 17 in Haida Nation, supra note 4, are opposite here: “Where 
treaties remain to be concluded, the honour of the Crown requires negotiations leading to a just 
settlement of Aboriginal claims. Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with 
2016] FROM CONSULTATION TO CONSENT 265 
 
IV. REVISITING SUBSTANTIVE CONSENT: A MARGINAL CONCEPT IN CANADIAN 
CONSULTATION LAW? 
Recognizing the ongoing interests of Aboriginal peoples in the use of lands covered 
by Aboriginal title or historical treaties prompts a closer look at the role of consent 
within the duty to consult. The Supreme Court of Canada has held, most recently in 
Tsilhqot’in, that holders of Aboriginal title have “the right to choose the uses to 
which the land is put and to enjoy its economic fruits.”111 Aboriginal title arises from 
occupation at the time of the assertion of Crown sovereignty and it crystallizes at that 
time, not upon subsequent confirmation by the courts.112 Aboriginal groups with a 
strong prima facie claim to Aboriginal title therefore have a strong claim to 
participate in decision-making about the uses of their traditional lands.113 For their 
part, the Aboriginal partners to historical land-sharing treaties, as I have suggested 
above, have the right to participate in an ongoing dialogue with the Crown. This 
dialogue is not just about the allocation of benefits from treaty lands, but also about 
the need to implement the treaty in accordance with the changing circumstances that 
both parties knew would inevitably develop over the decades and centuries following 
the initial treaty negotiation. Those treaty relationships were entered into with the 
intention of binding the parties indefinitely, and therefore none of the parties to those 
treaties expected that the written terms of those treaties, in the words of Binnie J 
(writing about Treaty 8) “constituted a finished land use blueprint.”114 
How do these reflections on the ongoing interests of Aboriginal treaty 
partners and groups with strong claims to Aboriginal title affect the question of 
consent in consultations about developments on their traditional lands? The 
consultation jurisprudence makes a distinction between the Crown’s obligation to 
negotiate underlying rights claims and its obligation to consult in connection with 
specific land-use proposals. In the former case, the Supreme Court has made clear 
that the Crown must honourably negotiate a resolution of those claims (that is, seek 
                                                                                                               
assumed Crown sovereignty, and to define Aboriginal rights guaranteed by s. 35 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982. Section 35 represents a promise of rights recognition, and “[i]t is always assumed that the 
Crown intends to fulfil its promises.” This promise is realized and sovereignty claims reconciled 
through the process of honourable negotiation” [citations deleted]. 
111 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 42 at para 67. Those uses are subject to an “inherent” limit in that land may not 
be used in ways that substantially limit its value for future generations given the nature of the group’s 
attachment to the land. 
112 Ibid at para 69. See also McNeil, “Aboriginal Title after Tsilhqot’in”, supra note 43 at 71−75. 
113 Ibid at paras 91, 93. In Tsilhqot’in, the Court found that the Tsilhqot’in people had a strong prima facie 
claim and that the provincial government’s intrusion on their rights was significant, necessitating 
“significant consultation and accommodation in order to preserve the Tsilhqot’in interest.” 
114 Mikisew, supra note 8 at para 27. The paragraph in full reads: “Thus none of the parties in 1899 
expected that Treaty 8 constituted a finished land use blueprint. Treaty 8 signalled the advancing dawn 
of a period of transition. The key, as the Commissioners pointed out, was to “explain the relations” that 
would govern future interaction ‘and thus prevent any trouble’.” The historical land-sharing treaties 
themselves arose within the context of an ongoing history of established and evolving relations between 
the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, a context within which the signing of a treaty document at one point 
in time should not be viewed in isolation: see e.g. Janna Promislow, “Treaties in History and Law” 
(2014) 47 UBC L Rev 1085. 
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an outcome to which both parties consent).115 In the context of consultations about 
specific developments, as we have seen, the Crown must also engage in dialogue, 
and the conduct required of the Crown during that dialogue varies in proportion to 
the strength of the Aboriginal claim and the impact of the proposed decision. 
However, in all but the most trivial cases, the Crown is obliged to enter the 
consultation with the objective of substantially responding to the Aboriginal group’s 
rights and interests. In the words of Lamer CJC in Delgamuukw: 
[E]ven in these rare cases when the minimum acceptable standard is 
consultation, this consultation must be in good faith, and with the intention 
of substantially addressing the concerns of the aboriginal peoples whose 
lands are at issue. In most cases, it will be significantly deeper than mere 
consultation. Some cases may even require the full consent of an 
aboriginal nation, particularly when provinces enact hunting and fishing 
regulations in relation to aboriginal lands.116  
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, as we have seen, have indicated that 
obtaining Aboriginal consent is not generally a necessary element of consultations, 
except in certain cases of established Aboriginal rights, like Aboriginal title.117 Still, 
the obligation during consultations to engage in good faith dialogue, with the 
intention of addressing the other’s concerns – in the words of McLachlin CJC, “a 
process of balancing interests, of give and take”118 – appears very similar to the 
process of negotiating with a view to seeking agreement. 
While the Canadian consultation jurisprudence rules out a general veto for 
Aboriginal peoples over developments on traditional lands, nothing in the Supreme 
Court’s judgments from Haida Nation onward is inconsistent with the proposition 
that both parties must participate in consultations with a view to seeking consensus 
about the ultimate decision. Indeed, for the Crown and Aboriginal peoples to seek 
consensus about individual developments on traditional lands, while negotiating a 
longer term resolution of underlying claims, appears perfectly consistent with 
reconciliatory purpose of section 35. Agreement may not always be achievable, as 
the courts who must address litigation about claimed rights are perfectly aware. But 
to recognize that both sides are obligated to engage in consultations with a view to 
reaching mutual consent, particularly in cases of strong Aboriginal title claims and 
significant intrusions on historical treaty lands, is to give due recognition to the 
importance of the underlying interests at stake and of the ongoing constitutional 
relationship of the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. Enforcing an obligation to engage 
in consultations with a view to reaching mutual consent is no more difficult than the 
enforcement of the other nuanced obligations set out in the consultation 
jurisprudence. It is an engagement, as we have seen, that has already been embraced 
                                                
115 See e.g. Haida Nation, supra note 4 at paras 17, 25. 
116 Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para 168 [emphasis added]. 
117 Haida Nation, supra note 4 at para 48. Even in such cases, as we have seen, the Crown may still 
proceed with its decision if it can justify its infringement of the section 35 right. 
118 Ibid. 
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by significant industry associations. And the framing of consultations as directed 
toward seeking agreement is a direction, like the other directions in the consultation 
jurisprudence, that provincial and federal governments are quite capable of 
incorporating within their operational policies.  
The obligation to engage in consultations with the objective of seeking 
agreement would not prevent either party in the process from defending their 
interests firmly, but it would require both parties to demonstrate an openness to 
discussing creative options for resolving their differences. Agreement will not 
always be achieved, but the paradigm within which the parties interact will 
necessarily shift when mutual consent is expressly identified as one of the objectives 
of the consultation process. Recognizing an obligation to engage with a view to 
obtaining mutual consent does not go as far as some learned commentators, critical 
of the manner in which the section 35 jurisprudence has addressed the issue of 
Aboriginal sovereignty and legal orders, would undoubtedly wish.119 Those critiques 
raise pressing questions about the de jure relationship between Aboriginal peoples 
and the Crown – questions which it is beyond the scope of this analysis to explore. 
Nonetheless, explicitly underlining the importance of seeking consent in 
consultations would demonstrate respect for Aboriginal peoples’ agency and 
autonomy in their relationship with the state. And, in doing so, Canadian law on the 
duty to consult would incidentally move toward harmony with the principle of 
consent set out in Article 32 of the UNDRIP. 
V. CONCLUSION  
The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada has done much in recent decades 
to spur continuing dialogue between Indigenous peoples and the Crown regarding 
the contemporary meaning and application of Aboriginal and treaty rights. As Brian 
Slattery has observed, the direction provided by the Court through its interpretation 
of section 35 and the duty to consult means that “the Crown, with judicial assistance, 
has the duty to foster a new legal order for Aboriginal rights, through negotiation and 
agreement with the Aboriginal peoples affected.”120 As we have seen, that dialogue 
must permit Aboriginal peoples to engage Crown representatives in accordance with 
their own perspectives on the issues at stake. Seeking the consent of Aboriginal 
peoples to the process within which their voices will be heard in consultations with 
the Crown, jointly developing appropriate mechanisms for managing disputes that 
arise during consultations, addressing the just allocation of benefits from proposed 
developments, and engaging in consultations about specific land use proposals with a 
view to seeking mutual consent to the final decision are all appropriate steps toward 
                                                
119 See e.g. Gordon Christie, “A Colonial Reading Of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow, Delgamuuk and 
Haida Nation” (2005) 23 Windsor YB Access Just 17, Borrows, “Alchemy”, supra note 35 and Val 
Napoleon, “Tsilhqot’in Law of Consent”, (2015) 48 UBC L Rev 873. For the argument that reliance on 
the historical treaties “taking up” provisions in a manner that significantly affects Aboriginal harvesting 
rights should be accompanied by the substantive consent of Aboriginal peoples, see Imai, “Consult”, 
supra note 33. 
120 Brian Slattery, “The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights” (2007) 38 SCLR (2d) 595 at 627. 
268 UNBLJ     RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 67 
 
ensuring that the Aboriginal voices are duly heeded during the consultations 
mandated by Canadian law. Just as importantly, all are indicia that a court may 
properly consider in determining whether the consultation parties have engaged in 
have been conducted in good faith.  
Expressly recognizing the parties’ obligations to take these steps during 
consultations about significant changes to the use of traditional lands will bring a 
salutary clarification to the law governing the duty to consult Aboriginal peoples – a 
clarification that will support Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal governments as they 
seek to move forward consensually while they come to grips with long-standing  
underlying rights claims. To acknowledge that Canadian law requires seeking 
consensus at each of these levels during consultations will not satisfy all concerns 
about the adequacy of the current direction provided by the courts. But clarification 
of the law proceeds incrementally, and the explicit acknowledgement of the 
principles described above will permit a fuller recognition of the agency of 
Aboriginal peoples and their unique constitutional relationship with the other orders 
of government in Canada and, finally, of the UNDRIP principle that indigenous 
peoples have the right to participate on their own terms in decision-making 
concerning the use of their traditional lands. 
 
 
 
 
